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Review by
Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D.
American Public University System
British historian Frederick Taylor, author of several previous works on
Germany and World War II, has turned his attention here to the coming of
war in Europe. It should first be noted that the book is not entirely about
1939, for as Taylor states on the first page of his introduction, the period he
addresses begins with the autumn of 1938 and Hitler’s machinations
leading to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and carries through the autumn
of 1939, culminating with the invasion of Poland. A second point about
Taylor’s approach is also worth noting at the outset. Any work of this sort,
which deals with a topic of such complexity as the convoluted path to world
war must necessarily include an account of the belligerents’ travels along
that path. In that regard, much of the book is a standard treatment and not
precisely “a people’s history,” as the title implies. Taylor does an excellent
job weaving in first-hand accounts to provide a sense of how the events
playing out on the world stage might have affected individual people, and
though he achieves a good balance, the effect does not live up entirely to the
book’s sub-title. However, much as a good account of a battle relies on the
use of first-hand accounts by participants to add color and clarity to the
narrative, the “people’s history” segments of Taylor’s book do accomplish
that and more.
Taylor was wise to begin with the fall of 1938, for the discussion of British
and German perspectives on the prospect of war over Czechoslovakia
provide the groundwork for the evolution of those views in the post-“peace
for our time” era after the Munich Accords. By the fall of 1939, Britons were
no less fearful of a war than in 1938, but they had used the intervening time
to recognize that Europe was dealing with an insatiable despot bent on
territorial acquisition, suppression of dissent, and persecution of Jews. The
personal accounts of Britons help to illustrate the decline of appeasement as
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a political tool, and readers can sense a distinct shift in attitudes as the fate
of Poland hung in the balance.
One can also follow the shift of opinion among Germans, whose initial
skepticism and fear of war in 1938 were mitigated by 1939. This was a
result of a growing confidence in Hitler’s ability to achieve his aims without
warfare, and to Goebbels’ propaganda efforts justifying intervention in
Poland as necessary to stem Polish abuses of the German population there.
In the course of describing the historical events, Taylor illustrates the
differences between British public opinion and that of a manipulated
German populace. In his view, the events of 1939 mark a watershed for
Germany in which the attitude of many citizens was transformed “from
passive, even sullen, accepters of the Fuhrer’s will to accomplices in
genocidal horror” (13). The influence of Nazi propaganda on that
transformation is one of the book’s key themes.
As the personal accounts illustrate, many average Germans were conflicted
about the events of this period. Many acknowledged that obtaining the
Sudetenland would be a good thing, as would be the reversal of injustices
inflicted at Versailles in 1919, such as eliminating the Polish Corridor
separating Germany from East Prussia. Yet they were somewhat skeptical
that Hitler could achieve those ends without dragging the nation into
another war at a time when things were going so well for much of the
population. Relieving that skepticism fell in large part to the German press,
which abnegated its responsibility for impartiality and whose
correspondents who rarely believed their own stories nonetheless dutifully
reported precisely what Goebbels’ Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda fed them. While average Germans could hardly verify what
was happening on the Czech or Polish frontier, the news coverage after
Kristallnacht in November 1938 clearly illustrated the extent to which the
media was suspect. At Goebbels’ insistence, the press reports alleged that
violence against Jews on that night of broken glass resulted from a
spontaneous outpouring of wrath from the general population and had not
been orchestrated by the government. The population was not so gullible as
Goebbels’ believed, however. The press versions were met with widespread
derision, yet ultimately such evidence of manipulation was ignored. Hitler’s
frank admission soon afterwards that he was working to shape the German
people psychologically in order to prepare them for a time when violence
and force would be required to achieve his goals illustrates the start of a
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transformation from a relatively pacifistic attitude to one in which the
people would become “a hardened, militant mass who would follow him
into war” (103).
Taylor attempts a good balance between his coverage of Germany and
Britain, but the events on the Continent prove ultimately more fascinating.
Both populations were enjoying the benefits that attend a consumer culture
and no one wanted war. Britons were clearly more uneasy, however, as
their preparations for possible air raids showed. Many busily constructed
private shelters in their gardens, while a plan to evacuate children from
areas vulnerable to bombing showed the trepidation with which city
dwellers faced the reputation of Goering’s vaunted Luftwaffe. Conversely,
average Germans did far less—almost nothing—to prepare for war. Only in
building their army did the British fall short, with the May 1939 Military
Training Act constituting a weak substitute for the compulsory military
service required by most European armies. For rural bumpkins, it was quite
the lark.
One minor criticism is that Taylor sometimes gives readers insufficient
background on the sources he draws from, which, where it is relevant,
would permit readers to better understand the context of their statements.
This includes some individuals, but it becomes more important when
relying on Sopade reports for example. There is no mention of the role of
the German Social Democratic Party in Exile (Sopade), which naturally
might be expected to report unfavorably on conditions in Nazi Germany. It
would undoubtedly be senseless to draw on the accounts of die-hard Nazis
who swallowed Goebbels’ poison, but the views ranging from those provided
by lukewarm supporters to outright opponents of the regime would be an
even greater strength if more context was provided. Similar to Sopade,
there is no information provided on the nature of Britain’s MassObservation project, which generally drew its results from a limited
segment of the population. In short, despite their evidentiary value, Taylor
misses some opportunities for a more critical evaluation of the sources
used.
Those observations aside, the work is an enjoyable, readable, and succinct
history of the events that led to the Second World War, and it is greatly
enhanced by the first-hand perspectives of individual witnesses. Taylor
achieves his main purpose of illustrating what ordinary people experienced
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as events unfolded, and most importantly he admirably highlights how
turmoil in the German psyche led its citizens along the road from passivity
to “accomplices in genocidal horror” (13). The book should enjoy a wide
audience with an interest in this period of history.
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